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In response to the COVID-19 outbreak, there has been a flurry of digital tools proposed by teams all over the world that are designed to aid in returning to operations as usual once infection rates are low enough to move to the "test and trace" strategy. This work has traditionally been done by manual tracing but can be significantly sped up by so-called contact-tracing apps, which are usually downloaded to user smartphones.

The COVID-19 virus is unusual in being highly infectious in a period of up to 7 days before symptoms show. As a result, contacts cannot arguably be alerted speedily enough by conventional manual tracing, which obviously only starts after symptoms develop. This has provoked a global debate on how tracing apps should be built and what safeguards are necessary if they are not to jeopardize the privacy of entire populations. In Asia, such apps have been seen as a successful part of the tracing and testing suppression strategy, but in Europe and elsewhere, privacy considerations are seen as vital. A lack of trust and confidence in the app will prevent people from downloading and using it. For the app to achieve its purpose, around 80% of the smartphone-using population (\~60% of the UK population) must download and use it, which is a very high target to achieve.

This debate around contact-tracing apps has revolved largely around the choice of a centralized or decentralized architecture for them. Centralized systems can collect more data, which may be useful for epidemiology as well as simple contact tracing, but questions exist whether they can ever be considered sufficiently anonymized for the protection of individual privacy. By contrast, a decentralized system provides near-complete privacy protection as the data gathered stay on the phones of users, but some argue that these are less useful for the long-term suppression of the disease.

A particular issue for the UK is that, unusually in Europe, it at least initially chose to go with a centralized design. This was partly due to the constraints placed by early lack of testing capacity, which meant that self-reported symptoms from users, not confirmed test results, were used to generate the cascades of contact notifications. Self-reported symptoms by their nature generate large amounts of false positives, which could only be mitigated by collecting more contextual data and thus required a centralized risk-scoring capability. The UK's choice of architecture has since been revisited so that contact alerts are only set off by actual positive testing---but this design choice may also yet be rolled back or reconsidered again. Interestingly, Norway, which also chose to go with a centralized architecture and added collection of location data, has now been told by its privacy regulator that this design is not legally acceptable, as of June 2020. Partly as a result of these struggles over design, the UK's app has been substantially delayed: tests began on the Isle of Wight in early May with intent to launch within that month; however, rollout is currently scheduled for early July with a possibility of further delay still.

The discussion in the UK to date has thus very much been embroiled in the technical aspects, at the expense of fully investigating the wider legal, ethical, and societal impacts of such apps. The Coronavirus (Safeguards) Bill starts from the position that although the UK already has privacy and data protection (DP) law, it currently does not provide adequate legal safeguards for the contact tracing app.

Privacy is not the only issue: this ignores *how* the app will be used, especially given the imperative toward high uptake. Will people be compelled to carry phones? Will they be compelled to install the app? Which organizations (e.g., the government, employers, managers of public and private businesses) can make users show what notifications they have had? What consequences will users suffer if they don't share their notifications? What groups may suffer most harm and discrimination? Who will provide oversight to this track and trace system?

The Coronavirus (Safeguards) Bill deliberately looks beyond the available technical options, and the current UK choice, seeking to propose legal safeguards that are technology neutral.[@bib1] The purpose is to protect the rights of individuals in an unprecedented emergency context.

There are five main suggestions made in the bill:1**No compulsion to own a smartphone.** No one shall be penalized for not having a phone (or other device), leaving house without a phone, failing to charge their phone, turning off Bluetooth, etc.2**No compulsion to install or use the app.** No one shall be compelled to install a symptom and contact-tracing app or to share messages of their status on such an app on request (e.g., to an employer or insurer or university).3**Deletion.** Personal data collected by apps must be deleted as soon as possible, or at latest after 28 days.4**Immunity "certificates".** Certificates should not become internal passports for anyone but police; there should be no discrimination/exclusion on this basis unless allowed by proportionality analysis.5**Oversight.** The Coronavirus Safeguarding Commissioner should review safeguards in emergency laws, and an appropriate tribunal should be appointed to hear individual complaints

This is not simply a debate about privacy and data protection but about the human rights that privacy has been acting as a proxy for in the public debate; i.e., autonomy, freedom of movement, freedom to work, and freedom from discrimination among others.

Point 1 of the bill rests on the argument that those without a smartphone are often the most disempowered in our society, as they are more likely to be living in poverty, be aged, be disabled, or be non-techno-literate. Any system that aims to improve the health of the population as a whole cannot further marginalize disempowered populations through accessibility limitations like the requirement to have and use a smartphone.

Point 2 of the bill represents a difficult societal choice. Many would argue that employers (for example) should be entitled to take what steps they can to safeguard their workplaces. On the other hand, given the likely high number of false positives, should error-based discrimination be allowed against workers who have good reasons not to want to download the app or share their status? Minorities and vulnerable groups may with reason fear supplying pervasive trackable information to the government about their social contacts.

Point 3 adds specifics in relation to the technology of the NHSX app, expanding on the safeguards already provided by the general protections of DP law. The bill, rather than reintroducing the whole of DP law, takes the approach of fine tuning one important point: that of retention and deletion of data. Current law says that personal data may be retained as long as necessary to fulfil the purpose for which they were collected. In a pandemic situation, this might arguably be forever, as the disease will never go away and research will continue. Accordingly, the bill suggests a hard limit of either the end of the emergency period in the 2020 emergency legislation or, if possible, 28 days.

Point 4 is concerned with legislating to safeguard novel and invasive technology developed at speed in an emergency life-threatening situation. "Immunity passports" have been much mentioned in the press but do not as yet exist in the UK. The bill takes the view that basic minimum safeguards should be taken to forestall future harm from such passports even though the full technical and social details of the system are unknown at this time.

Finally, the bill encourages the setting up of an independent watchdog to act in parallel to the Information Commissioners Office, which can oversee the entire working of the application as well as address individual complaints.

The bill and the entire contact-tracing app experience raises familiar challenges for all those working in data ethics. How do you tackle discrimination? How do you ensure you are collecting only the data you need and only for the stated purpose? Who is responsible for ensuring the data collection is legal and ethical, and who manages cases where individuals feel they have not been treated fairly? Profoundly, what is the balance between public good and private rights, especially in an unprecedented emergency?

These questions are not easy to answer and will be debated extensively in the future. This bill is the latest step in ensuring that these discussions continue and is a valuable addition to the conversation. For practicing data scientists across domains, this case study provides an insight into the evolving nature of the legislative environment and a reminder that, when working with data, questions about the ethical and legal impact should be considered at every stage in the process.
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